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# **MID TERM REVIEW OF THE URAIA'S STRATEGIC PLAN**

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## **FINAL REPORT**

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Produced by Delta  
Partnership for Uraia

Date: 08th September  
2014

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## Acronyms

CE	Civic Education
CEE	Civic Education and Engagement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CEDMAC	Consortium for Empowerment & Development of Marginalised Communities
CoK	Constitution of Kenya
CRECO	Constitution and Reform Education Consortium
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
ECEP	Ecumenical Civic Education Programme
EMB	Elections Management Board
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GoK	Government of Kenya
ICT	Information, Communication and Technology
IEBC	Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission
KANU	Kenya African National Union
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEL	Monitoring Evaluation and Learning
NAMCEK	National Muslim Civic Education Programme
NCEP	National Civic Education Programme
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PWD	Persons With Disabilities
SID	Society for International Development
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIG	Special Interest Group
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
Uraia	National Civic Education Programme
UBI	Uchaguzi Bora Initiative
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States of America International Development
ToC	Theory of Change
ToT	Trainer of trainers

## Executive Summary

This review process was commissioned for three main reasons: 1) to explore the interaction between Uraia Trust and the macro environment, 2) assess what is working and what is not, and 3) to identify opportunities to improve going forwards. This review will inform future strategies and interventions undertaken by Uraia. The review team used a variety of techniques to carry out the assignment including literature review of past documents, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and a mobile survey. An analytical framework which examined three key questions was designed and guided the analysis of the data collected. The full results are found in the findings section of this report.

## Context

**Uraia Trust** was established in 2011 as a successor to Kenya's National Civic Education Programme phase I and II (NCEP I & II). Uraia's approach is to promote citizenship from a rights and responsibility aspect. Since 2009, Uraia has been working on enhancing citizen participation in fulfilling and achieving the goals and priorities articulated in the National Accord, focusing on national priorities such as national reconciliation, inclusion of youth and marginalised groups, increased leadership accountability.

The National Civic Education Program II was a continuation of the NCEP I, began in 1999. The program took the name "Uraia", meaning "citizenship" in Swahili. Collectively, the two programs represent nearly a decade of donor commitment to civic education in Kenya. NCEP II was originally designed in part to address what donors and CSOs believed would be a new national constitution that was to be adopted in 2005. The failure of the effort to create a new constitution meant NCEP II had to focus more generally on CE not tied specifically to the constitution

## Findings

Overall, Uraia has made significant headway within the timeframe of the current strategic plan that was under review. With the good team they have at both the secretariat and governance bodies level acting as a starting point, they have cultivated strong partnerships with not only the consortia partners but also with other strategic partners such as donors, governments and the implementing partners. Relevance of issues addressed and Uraia's brand equity has helped push the different agendas forward and generate traction at both the national and local levels.

The biggest success according to the review respondents was the peaceful elections held in March 2013. With the 2007 elections having been volatile, there was fear especially in areas that were worst affected that there would be a repeat of the same come 2013. Using the Uchaguzi Bora Initiative, Uraia sought to support CSOs activities aimed at fostering and expanding citizen participation in the electoral process; promoting peaceful coexistence of communities; entrenching constitutionalism in the electioneering process; enhancing practical mechanism for electing leaders of integrity; enhancing credibility in the judicial system to achieve participatory, peaceful, free, and fair elections; and lobbying, advocacy and policy influencing on electoral issues.

In addition to the peaceful elections in 2013, Uraia and their partner organisation's activities contributed towards an increase in voter numbers to 14.296 million registered voters, from 13.043 million in 2007. This translated into a record 85.9% casting the ballot up from 69.1% during the 2007 elections.

Another major achievement over this period was the increased level of awareness by the Kenya citizens on democracy and governance issues and more specifically the roles and responsibilities of both from the duty bearers and the rights holders. This coupled with increased knowledge and understanding on the constitution has brought with it increased scrutiny which has translated into growing levels of accountability and transparency at both national and county levels.

Whereas the numbers of both women and men taking an interest and actively participating in political processes has been on the rise there is still some work to do in order to ensure greater levels of inclusiveness in democracy and governance issues are achieved. More can be done to especially increase engagement with marginalised and minority communities, youth, and differently abled persons. The materials used and mechanisms for engagement will play a very important role and with growing mobile and internet coverage, Uraia should be thinking of sustainable ICT enabled and cost effective ways that will not only be efficient but will also increase overall effectiveness.

The review draws attention to Uraia's role in transforming Kenya into a more mature democracy. Uraia's form and structure was determined by the function it was meant to play as a facilitating organisation. Whilst the role performed has been largely that of a facilitating organisation, some activities undertaken were of an implementing nature. Some of these activities included getting and putting in place county coordinators, conducting training initiatives and playing an active role in capacity assessment and capacity building of the partner organisations. With facilitating and implementing going hand in hand, the distinguishing factors became increasingly blurred. Taking on some roles that were implementing in nature coupled up with the lean structure that Uraia adopted, left the trust slightly stretched.

In order to comprehensively address the key drivers of the state of democracy and governance in the country, Uraia's strategic plan came up with 18 objective areas of focus and three strategic pillars. The objective areas were developed through looking at Uraia from 4 different perspectives – that of the beneficiaries, that of Uraia's internal processes, that of Uraia's learning and growth and that of Uraia's resources whereas the pillars represented the interventions that Uraia had chosen to undertake in order to achieve the goals of the strategic plan.

An analysis of the performance of Uraia across the 18 objectives revealed some variance across the objective areas. Whereas there was some significant success in some objectives, in others the performance was slightly below average. The objectives relating to civic education and institution transformation generally performed better than those relating to civic engagement and this was largely driven by availability of funds. Donor funds were mostly targeted at civic education initiatives and not civic engagement.

The finding above revealed the extent of reliance on donor funding. With over 50% of total funding coming from international donors, Uraia's financial position remains uncertain especially bearing in mind that donors have been tightening their budgets and revising their thematic areas of focus. One

of the highest priorities over the coming months will be to develop a fund raising strategy that will look at ways to sustain existing funding options in addition to diversifying the funding sources. Uraia needs to look outside conventional funding sources and explore other options such as crowd funding and philanthropic foundations to name a few.

Further investigations revealed that the Monitoring and Evaluation function needs to be strengthened going forwards. This is hardly surprising given the difficulty faced by many organisations to best incorporate and capitalise on M&E. More specifically for Uraia, there needs to be a common understanding of the contribution of each member of staff towards ensuring the organisation captures learning and ensuring the lessons learnt are used to improve decision making and organisation performance. A results oriented culture will need to be inculcated in addition to strengthening the current systems and tools for data collection and analysis.

The diagram below shows the factors that facilitated and inhibited Uraia's success during the period under review.



## Opportunities

Going forward, there is no silver bullet that will comprehensively drive Uraia towards achieving the intended goals and vision but rather, a combination of several factors.

From a macro environment point of view, there is need to support policies that create an enabling environment for operation of CSO's and increase general literacy levels in the country.

From an internal organisation point of view, the two areas with the single biggest potential for impact are: a) focussing on a purely facilitative role (moving away from undertaking some roles that are implanting in nature such as selection and recruitment of county coordinators and active participation in capacity building of implementing partners); and b) focussing on fewer objective areas. With the number of CSO's and other potential implementing partners being high, Uraia should

position itself as the go to organisation on all research and knowledge matters pertaining democracy and governance i.e. some sort of “Think Tank” with both a national and regional reach.

From a thematic point of view, issues based politics and tribalism are areas which have received minimal attention yet they have contributed significantly over the years to the present political situation that Kenya finds itself in. These together with promoting national unity and cohesion need to be given great emphasis going forward.

As a matter of priority, Uraia should focus on the following areas in the short term (0-6 months):

1. Role as a facilitating organisation;
2. Narrowing down the number of its programmatic areas (2 to 3 over the remaining period of the strategic plan);
3. Developing a funding strategy in order to ensure sustainability of its programmes;
4. developing a robust MEL action plan ;


## 1. Introduction and purpose of the report

### 1.1 Review objective

The main objective of the review was to assess the extent to which Uraia trust has achieved its objectives in terms of its implementation of its strategic plan to date. Uraia wishes to learn of the impact it has achieved in creating an informed citizenry in order to inform its future planning for the remainder of the strategic plans lifetime. This involved scrutinising the strategic plan, the theory of change, underlying assumptions, trust's profile and establishing ways to mitigate the risks.

### 1.2 Assignment approach and analytical framework

The review process entailed a thorough interrogation of the relevance and appropriateness of Uraia's strategic plan with respect to the current external and internal environment in which the organisation operates. Based on the nature of the challenges tackled through the current planning period, we assessed efficiency and effectiveness of the strategies and programmes adopted, the overall management approach, and coherence and coordination of the interventions as they were implemented.



To understand how the Trust has been performing, the review developed an approach to inform the review's data collection and analysis. This mixed method approach enabled us to target all relevant stakeholders in addition to ensuring we adequately looked into both quantitative as well as qualitative information in the most efficient and robust manner.





- a) The focus group discussions (FGD's) were held over 3 days in Nairobi with Uraia's implementing partners and civic educators operating across the country. The FGD participants came from the Coast region, Eastern and Central region, Nairobi region, Rift valley region, North Eastern region and Western and Nyanza regions;
- b) Key informant interviews were held with stakeholders who ranged from Uraia secretariat staff members, members of the advisory council, Uraia trust trustees, strategic partners as well as donor organisations. The full list of individuals interviewed was developed by Uraia and can be found in the annex section;
- c) A mobile survey was undertaken to get opinions of the general public on the key issues of impact and access to civic education materials and opportunities. The mobile survey was administered through mobile phones to a random sample of 500 people. They were asked questions focussing on impact of civic education initiatives as well as where they currently access Civic Education and where they would prefer to access it in the future;

### 1.3 Methodology

Our approach and methodology was informed by our experience gained from undertaking similar assignments with similar programmes / organisations and within the same or similar geographic context. This work was carried out by a core team of 3 consultants and 3 support staff.

**Initial briefing/Fact Finding** – This was to confirm our shared understanding of the context of the work, what had been done previously and what was expected from us. The meeting helped us to better understand Uraia's expectations and further help them understand our approach. This also gave both parties at an early stage an opportunity to raise any pertinent issues relating to the assignment at hand.

**Desk review** – This entailed going through the relevant programme documentation. For this assignment, we in particular looked at the Uchaguzi Bora Initiative programme documents including the final evaluation report, NCEP II major findings report as well as annual work plans and progress

reports (both narrative and financial) amongst other documents. We looked to identify any patterns but also used this opportunity to interrogate aspects such as positioning, knowledge management and brokering, partnerships as well as resource mobilisation and utilisation. A full list of all the documents consulted can be found in the annex section.

**Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group discussions** – This was the main data collection method which was also used as a follow up exercise to fill in any gaps identified in the desk review phase. Using a questionnaire built on the Trust’s objective areas, we talked to key stakeholders to gauge their view on the performance of the organisation as a whole as well as that of the relevant programmes components. Focus Group Discussions were held with implementing partners and civic educators from all regions in the country where they also addressed questions built upon the Trust’s objectives as per the strategic plan.

**Mobile survey** – For this particular assignment, we decided to bring on board a mobile survey component in order to capture input from the general public. This was necessary as the timelines did not allow for the review to undertake primary data collection. This mobile survey was administered through the mobile phones where a random sample of 500 people opted in to the survey and was asked questions focussing on impact of civic education initiatives as well as where they currently access CE and where they would prefer to access it in the future. These two particular focus areas were chosen by Uraia. The respondents were randomly selected by the county coordinators from all 47 counties and the common traits amongst all of them were they should not have had any formal interaction with Uraia in the past. The sample comprised all genders as well as the youth, disabled and those from marginalised and minority communities.

**Analysis and report writing** - The findings from the interviews, questionnaires, observations and desk research were collated and synthesised. We used SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) to analyse the responses.

**Validation Workshop** - A half day workshop with Uraia staff/ stakeholders was undertaken to disseminate the preliminary report and to capture their comments.

**Final comprehensive report** - This final report was put together incorporating the feedback from the validation session.

## Limitations

Reviews such as this are heavily reliant on the available information: where that information is easily accessible, comprehensive and the analysis is robust. Where the information is incomplete or focused on the description of activities and outputs, the analysis of impact is weaker.

In carrying out this review, the review team noted specific challenges as detailed below. The purpose of listing them at this point is to clarify at the start some of the boundaries of the analysis for the reader.

- a) Due to tight timelines and geographic dispersion, the review was restricted to relying on secondary information as there was limited time to get primary data through field visits for

validation and verification. The review however tried to counter this through the focus group discussions that brought together implementing partners from all over the country and the administering of the mobile survey to the general public.

- b) Evidence was limited. This is a common situation as many programmes tend to focus on the activities and expenditure during implementation. Case studies would provide very useful examples of performance. Whilst training information was collected systematically, there was little follow up after the training and study tours to showcase the changes realised;

#### 1.4 Ethics Applied

The consultant team was dedicated to ensuring that the highest standards of ethics will be applied in this review. Standards, norms and values to be applied included, but were not limited to:

- **Independence** - Team members ensured that they are not unduly influenced by the views or statements of any party;
- **Credibility** – The review was based on reliable data and observations;
- **Impartiality** – The team a) Operated in an impartial and unbiased manner at all stages of the review, b) Collected diverse perspectives on the subject under review, c) Guarded against distortion in their reporting caused by their personal views and feelings;
- **Confidentiality** – The team respected people’s right to provide information in confidence and made participants aware of the scope and limits of confidentiality. The team ensured that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source so that the relevant individuals are protected from reprisals;
- **Transparency** - The team clearly communicated to stakeholders the purpose of the review, the criteria applied and the intended use of findings. The team disclosed the methodology in advance, and clearly describe this in the report, including the assumptions and values underlying the team’s judgements.

#### 1.5 Report structure

Coming after this introductory section, chapter two provides an analysis of the context within which Uraia is operating in. The overall key findings are summarised in chapter three. Chapter four uses the contextual analysis and findings to highlight and link key lessons with the related recommendations for improving future programmes and partnership arrangements. Finally, chapter five includes a brief conclusion section and the short term priority areas for immediate attention.

## 2. Context and Baseline

### 2.1 Context

The National Civic Education Program II was a continuation of the NCEP I, which began in 1999. The program took the name “Uraia”, meaning “citizenship” in Swahili. Collectively, the two programs represent nearly a decade of donor commitment to civic education in Kenya. Over this period, the Kenyan political context has changed significantly. In 2002, the long ruling party, KANU, lost the election and power changed hands via the ballot box for the first time in Kenyan history. Under KANU, the government saw Civic Education (CE) and the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that implemented it as highly partisan and anti-government. Government officials regularly harassed CE providers.<sup>1</sup>

NCEP II was originally designed in part to address what donors and CSOs believed would be a new national constitution that was to be adopted in 2005. The failure of the effort to create a new constitution meant NCEP II had to focus more generally on CE not tied specifically to the constitution. Management problems in the early stages of NCEP II meant implementation did not occur until 2006-2007, over a period of about 18 months. By its conclusion in August 2007, the next national elections in December 2007 were rapidly approaching. NCEP II officially ended its implementation in part to make way for more immediate voter education in the run up to the elections. The program was thus completed before the disputed December 2007 National Elections, and before the inter-communal violence and dislocations that wracked the nation in subsequent months.

Both NCEP I and II implemented civic education via CSOs rather than via government education programs. NCEP II requested proposals from Kenyan CSOs to be implementing partners and then chose 43 to partner in the program and grouped them into four consortia. Most of the 43 CSOs were already members of the four existing consortia listed below and through which much program activity flowed.

The selected CSOs ranged from secular human rights groups to religious groups (both Christian and Muslim) to groups focused on particular populations such as the disabled. The program funded proposals that included traditional CE workshops, as well as more innovative interventions involving theatre and other community activities.

The program was implemented via four consortia of CSOs, designed in part to foster greater coordination and cooperation within the sector. The consortia are:

- a. Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) – a national network of CSOs, some of which have been in the forefront of advocacy and civic education related to governance and human rights issues;
- b. Consortium for Empowerment and Development of Marginalized Communities (CEDMAC) – coordinating the works of CSOs representing marginalized and minority communities including

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<sup>1</sup> NCEP II goals, findings and recommendations - MSI

Muslims, pastoralists, people with disabilities, hunter-gatherers, forest dwellers, urban slum dwellers, riverine communities and ethnic minorities;

- c. Ecumenical Civic Education Program (ECEP) – a mechanism for coordinating the NCEP work of the two major church networks: the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) and the Protestant National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK);
- d. National Muslim Civic Education Consortium (NAMCEC) that comprises four CSOs: Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Kenya Council of Imams and Ulamaa, North Eastern Muslim Initiative and the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance.

Programme documents show that, by the end of August 2007, NCEP II-Uraia involved approximately 79,000 discrete workshops, poetry or drama events, informal meetings, cultural gatherings, and other public events, as well as extensive programming on democracy, governance, and rights-related topics through television, radio, and other mass media outlets. Documents indicate that some 10 million individuals were exposed to face-to-face civic education activities. Many more were reached via the mass media component, which represented a new and innovative feature of NCEP II-Uraia compared with its predecessor.

**Uraia Trust** was established in 2011 as a successor to Kenya's National Civic Education Programme phase I and II (NCEP I & II). Uraia's approach is to promote citizenship from a rights and responsibility aspect. Since 2009, Uraia has been working on enhancing citizen participation in fulfilling and achieving the goals and priorities articulated in the National Accord<sup>2</sup>, focusing on priorities such as national reconciliation, inclusion of youth and marginalised groups, increase of leadership accountability.

Uraia Trust's core mandate is to facilitate the civic education, civic engagement and institutional transformation countrywide, based on the application and implications of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. In this regard, Uraia delivers on four key result areas, namely: 1) Internalization of the Constitution by all persons, 2) Independent and credible Judiciary, 3) Peaceful, free, fair and credible elections and, 4) Promoting citizens participation in political processes especially the youth, women, persons with disability and minorities/marginalized communities/groups.

This is the work Uraia has committed to deliver from 2011 to 2015, which is anchored on the full implementation of the Constitution of Kenya. Uraia is implementing the work in all counties across the nation with a key focus on how the Constitution applies to individuals and communities.

## 2.2 Baseline

A national baseline survey was undertaken in April 2012 to inform the design of the strategic plan. The key findings were as follows:

- a) On enhanced national reconciliation, as at the time of the survey, it could not be said that the country had healed from the post-election violence. 35% of those who were affected by

<sup>2</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Accord\\_and\\_Reconciliation\\_Act\\_2008](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Accord_and_Reconciliation_Act_2008)

the violence had forgiven the perpetrators of the violence; 35% of Kenyans affected by the violence<sup>3</sup> insisted they will not forgive but will exercise tolerance; 19.5% would only forgive on conditions such as compensation over lost property, life and or prosecution of the perpetrators of the -violence. A further 9.5% stated they would not forgive the perpetrators of the post-election violence;

- b) Regarding legal, electoral and judicial reforms, the major concern was how the implementation of the Constitution would be achieved and there was fear that the Executive, the Parliament, the Judiciary and the citizenry alike would fail to uphold the law;
- c) With regards to promoting access to justice, the survey revealed low public participation in judicial processes, reforms and inadequate knowledge of court systems in Kenya. The findings revealed that a majority of Kenyans (67.7%) were aware of where to report crimes and grievances. Access to the law courts however was limited with less than half (46.2%) of Kenyans agreeable that they can access law courts easily;
- d) With regard to promoting a people-centred government, devolution was mainly associated with decentralization of power and sharing national resources county wise. The survey reveals an information gap on the devolved structures and what constitutes devolution in the Kenyan context. Only 24.7% of the public understood how devolution would work and about 29% of the public stated they understood the county structures in the devolved governments;
- e) Concerning the realization of human rights particularly economic and social cultural rights, the public's understanding and interpretation was very narrow and rarely discussed in the context of the Constitution. The public did not consider it expressly the duty of the government to uphold human rights. Further, the survey revealed a public that is rarely involved in the development of legislative and policy frameworks on economic, social and cultural rights;
- f) For the enhanced inclusion of previously under-served or marginalized groups and communities, the current government was seen to have made significant attempts to include previously underserved, marginalized groups, like women and children, and minority ethnic communities in the country's development agenda;
- g) Under increased leadership accountability, the public's most desirable leadership quality is integrity. Kenyans are looking forward to a system that will allow only leaders of integrity to be elected and strong institutions that will ensure leaders provide quality service delivery (65.5%).
- h) In terms of women and leadership, the survey revealed a relatively patriarchal society that is not ready for a woman president; only 38% of Kenyans agreed they can vote in a woman president.

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<sup>3</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%93Kenyan\\_crisis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%93Kenyan_crisis)

### 3. Review Findings

The findings section is aimed at addressing three key questions that underpinned the review of Uraia's Strategic Plan:

- a) Did Uraia do what they set out to do and how have they performed? This section reviews relevant literature, and analyses performance of the three strategic pillars through the internal self-assessment questionnaire scores and the scores given by the external respondents on the 18 objective areas set out in the strategic plan;
- b) Has Uraia made a difference? This section outlines the findings on major results that Uraia played a key role in their achievement or contributed towards;
- c) Were these the right things to do? This section looks at strategic relevance through an analysis of a) the challenge (s) Uraia is trying to address; b) the theory of change which outlines the overall approach for overcoming the challenge; and c) the actions and interventions Uraia has chosen to address the challenges faced;

In addition to the three areas above, this section also includes sections on value for money, equity, monitoring and evaluation and the findings from the mobile survey.

#### 3.1 Did they do what they set out to do and how have they performed?

##### 3.1.1 Strategic Pillars

Outlined below are major findings over the last 3 years under the three pillars.

##### a) Civic Education

Civic education was the predominant pillar amongst the three pillars outlined in the strategic plan. The core mandate under this pillar was to develop a critical mass of civically educated citizens who would go on to demand and secure reforms so that good governance and democracy works for them. Some of the key findings are outlined below.

##### 2011

The major achievements on electoral reforms during this period involved the establishment of the new Election Management Body (EMB) and election related legislations that guided the management of the 5th Multi-Party Elections under the Constitution, 2010. Uraia incorporated the electoral reform agenda in the civic education and engagement programmes, as they were critical given that the country had a new governance and electoral system. This led to the designing of the election specific programme called Uchaguzi Bora Initiative that anchored on the Integrated Civic and Voter Education framework towards the 2013 Elections.

##### 2012

Uraia, together with the International Republican Institute (IRI), finalised the development of civic education and engagement learning materials. Specifically, the civic education handbook was completed and was later used during the training of trainers and civic educator workshops. The handbook was distributed to implementing partners and county civic educators. During the same period, identification of civic educators, starting with county coordinators, commenced. Together



with its consortia, Uraia identified 47 county coordinators and a subsequent 255 civic educators. The county coordinators, in addition to providing civic education in their respective counties have been responsible for supervising the work of other civic educators in the county.

Following the identification of civic educators and county coordinators, Uraia conducted a four day training of trainer's workshop at Multi Media University targeting 47 county coordinators. 302 male and female civic educators were trained during this period in addition to training of cultural workers and artists and the training and induction of implementing partners.

## **2013/14**

After the elections, Uraia has focussed on the areas of the constitution and more specifically devolution. Materials produced include a freely available version of the constitution of Kenya and posters talking on the roles and functions of different national and county level bodies and leaders.

### **b) Civic engagement**

Civic engagement was based on the assumption that there is an informed and educated citizenry, this will lead to that citizenry being engaged in various reform activities at various levels.

The civic engagement pillar includes advocacy, networking, research and tracking. As per the strategic plan, engagement would be on issues of concern to women and men ranging from devolved systems, leaders accountability, monitoring of public service delivery to performance of police and security amongst others.

Examples of results under this pillar include - As a result of the Civic education forums in Elgeyo Marakwet, The Youth Agenda facilitated youth interaction with county leadership in the County where the main agenda was on youth issues affecting the county. In Kisumu Keeping Alive Societies Hope (KASH) had sessions promoting citizen participation that resulted in the successful public petition challenging the election of the CDF committee in Kisumu. The petition was signed by 11,058 people (4417 men, 3670 men, 2008 youth and 140 PwDs). Great Rift Valley Development Agency (GRVDA) created linkages with government officials in Baringo County for civic education and tackling insecurity in the county. Uraia initiatives continued to promote citizen engagement in public affairs and more specifically Uraia supported implementing partners to engage in the legislative process and lodge various petitions aimed at retaining the integrity of the Constitution.

The Uchaguzi Bora initiative supported the establishment of county citizen participation forums in Siaya, Makueni, Kilifi and Taita Taveta which were engaged in vetting of leaders. In Siaya the citizen participation forums assisted in ensuring that candidates who did not meet the vetting criteria were not nominated by their parties, and where they were nominated, that they were not elected.

Despite the successes noted above, the review found that by and large, civic education has not translated into civic engagement to the extent earlier envisioned. This is largely due to three key factors namely: a) Cost implications for engagement – To actively participate one has to attend the forums physically which entails transport costs b) Time implications – The aforementioned forums take time c) Lack of trust in both the process and the outcome – 90% of the respondents are of the opinion that majority of the leaders are in it for personal gains and do not have the best interest of the general public.



Lastly, some respondents indicated that some of the civic engagement focus areas highlighted in the strategic plan were beyond the scope of what Uraia could deliver based on their competence and internally available skillsets. One such area was the focus area on the judiciary.

### **c) Institutional transformation**

This pillar focussed on the internal strengthening of Uraia Trust as an institution. The institutionalisation process has so far progressed well. The institution has transitioned to a Kenyan Trust to continue to spearhead work on civic education, civic engagement and transformation of partner institutions across the country. Independent and competitive recruitment and hiring of staff which was done by KPMG – Human Resource.

Governance structures comprising a board of trustees and advisory council are in place and operational. That said, some member of the governance bodies indicated they haven't been fully involved in strategic thinking and decision making. They were of the opinion that if better coordinated more can be gained from tapping from the knowledge and networks of these members.

Internal systems and structures are in place and generally performing to an acceptable standard. The only key area which was deemed to be performing sub optimally was the area of monitoring, evaluation and learning systems. Review respondents across the board agree that more attention needs to be put on strengthening the systems in addition to inculcating an M&E culture within the entire organisation with clear roles and responsibilities for all staff members.

### **3.1.2 Objective areas**

The 18 objectives outlined in the strategic plan were identified during the strategic plan development exercise by looking at Uraia from 4 different perspectives – that of the beneficiaries, of Uraia's internal processes, of Uraia's learning and growth and that of Uraia's resources.

Overall there has been significant success in achieving some of the planned objectives as outlined in the Uraia log-frame. However, Uraia's overall performance on the objectives has been average with the Trust performing better in certain objectives than others. 40% of the respondents reported that having 18 objectives has stretched the trust especially bearing in mind its limited resources. It was suggested that Uraia should focus on objectives where Uraia not only has a competitive advantage but also those having the most significant impact. An in-depth analysis of each objective can be found in the annexes outlining internal and external (Secretariat staff and review respondents) perspectives. The scoring ranged from 1 to 6 with 1 being poor performance and 6 being excellent performance.

### **Objectives overview**

The list below is an overview, more detailed information on each objective can be found in the annex section.

Best performance (5 or more):

- Producing skilled civic educators - Uraia's task was to identify quality people, train them and continue to support them through CSO's in the efforts to reach a million people;
- Developing civil society organisations – The task was to support CSO's become more effective;
- Leading and supporting advocacy initiatives – This entailed supporting lobbyists and advocates locally;
- Putting in place skilled and professional staff and leadership team – This entailed putting in place skilled and professional staff and appropriate systems.

Worst performance (2 or less):

- Capacity for men and women to demand accountability – The task was for Uraia to help men and women demand and get accountability as part of their engagement;
- Increased opportunity for men, women, youth, PWD's, minorities and marginalised groups – The task was to bring specific groups that are always excluded on board and ensure full participation;
- Utilising accountability mechanisms – Uraia was to use already provided for mechanisms to hold male and female leaders and duty bearers accountable;
- Diversify and grow funding streams – Uraia was to diversify its donor base and deepen commitment of donors including the private sector.

Staff assessed themselves more harshly than the respondents rating almost universally. In most cases, this was by a factor of one point but there were variations of 2. These were: Increased capacity for men and women to demand accountability (staff assessed as 2, respondents as 4); developing civil society organisations (staff assessed as 3, respondents as 5); and proving impact (staff assessed as 3, respondents as 5). This may have arisen due to different expectations between those within the organisation, who sought more impact, more support to CSOs and more evidence of impact, than those outside. Staff set themselves higher standards than the respondents.

### 3.1.3 Success factors

According to the review analysis, the following key factors contributed towards Uraia's success during the first phase of this strategic plan period.

- **Strength and reputation of the Uraia brand –** Uraia has been around since 2000, evolving from a civic education programme with limited scope to its current state of a trust with a national outreach. This longevity has brought with it familiarity and more specifically credibility that has made them a partner of choice for local partners as well as development partners and government.

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“The staff understand the mandate of the organization so well that they have been able to transfer the same knowledge to civic educators and implementing partners”

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- Leadership and professional staff** – The trust has over the years recruited, trained and developed professional and diverse staff who have an understanding of both the macro environment (political, social, economic) as well as the more specific social and political democracy and development. The members of staff, including the leadership team are respected and held in good regard by the majority of the respondents. The quality of members in the Board of Trustees and advisory council is high. However some of the respondents were of the opinion that the manner of engagement can be improved to tap into the breadth and knowledge of expertise available from these members.
- Quality Materials** – Uraia’s civic education materials have been praised for being resourceful and up to date especially on the 2010 constitution and its interpretation. Many respondents reported that Uraia is a leader for factual information and quality messages. In addition to this, the diversity of the resources such as information on social media (face-book), audio materials on their website, blogs, books and pamphlets has given the public different channels for accessing these materials.
 

“Uraia materials are practical and easy to understand”
- Facilitative role played by Uraia** –Uraia played an important intermediary role between Consortia partners, CSO’s, donor partners and government. This role has been as a convener, coordinator as well as team player. This was especially echoed by their civic education and engagement strategic partners UNDP- Amkeni and UN Women - Usawa. This has been particularly important in building the reputation and credibility of Uraia in addition to enabling it gain insights from like-minded organisations.
- Use of local trainers-** the Training of Trainer sessions were viewed as a noteworthy success. The use of innovative approaches such as theatre to convey the messages were seen as particularly useful. Use of local trainers was a success bearing in mind their local understanding (issues and culture) which increased the acceptance and ownership of the messages.
- Consortia partners** - Uraia’s Consortia is made up of four partners The Ecumenical Civic Education Programme, The National Muslim Civic Education Consortium , The Consortium for the Empowerment and Development of Marginalised Communities and The Constitution Reform and Education Consortia who have played a critical role in the establishment and evolution of Uraia from a programme to a Trust. The Consortia plays a key role in the country’s governance and development process, through ongoing advocacy and engagement with governance structures while providing continuous civic education to citizens to enable meaningful engagement. The consortia partners cover all 47 counties and are representative of diverse groups (members include CSO’s that deal with sectors such as youth, women, workers, pastoralist communities, ethnic minorities, coastal communities, squatters amongst others) which further enhances the reach Uraia has through them.

### 3.1.4 Barriers to success

However, achieving this success has not been simple or straightforward. The following impediments were noted during discussion and interviews with stakeholders:

- **Timing** – Due to civic education taking place close to the elections date, the timing for civic education initiatives at times clashed with campaign initiatives. The civic education recipients were drawn to rallies and away from civic education forums as they were more interested to hear what the leaders were promising and also to receive hand-outs from those seeking votes.
- **More focus on civic education and to a lesser extent on civic engagement** –The review found out that civic education has been predominant with civic engagement being undertaken to a lesser extent. The training activities which fall under civic education were scored highly whereas the civic engagement activities such as providing a platform or practical mechanisms for citizens - who receive civic education - to put it into action received an average score. The main reason for this has been that funding was targeted to civic education initiatives .
- **Funding** – Funding limitations have had an effect on the breadth and depth of activities that Uraia has been able to accomplish this far. In addition to lack of funds, late disbursements had an effect on not only effectiveness of the interventions but also efficiency and ultimately provision of value for money.
- **Monitoring, evaluation and learning**- Measuring results is of utmost importance as it helps tell success from failure, learn from successes and failures and more importantly make decisions. Currently, there is an M&E plan, however, the M&E system is not robust enough to capture, analyse and disseminate information in the most informative manner. In addition to this, secretariat staff members do not have a good understanding of the workings of the existing system in addition to their individual roles and responsibilities to ensure the organisation gets maximum value from the system.
- **Tribal politicisation** – According to majority of the respondents, tribal politics has greatly watered down the effects from the civic education interventions by propagating ethnicity.
- **Geographic reach** – With the geographic region for coverage being wide, transport infrastructure poor in some parts of the country, and insecurity high in some parts of the country, this has limited travel and consistent coverage of some parts of the country.
- **Illiteracy** – In some parts of the country, there are high illiteracy levels which have as a result limited the contact, frequency of exposure and absorption of civic education materials;

### 3.2 Have they made a difference?

This section focusses on assessing the impact felt so far as a result of Uraia's interventions. It outlines the review findings on the major results that Uraia has significantly contributed towards in the past 3 years. These were articulated to a huge extent by the implementing partners during the focus group discussions and further complemented by other stakeholders interviewed. A


noteworthy point here is that these successes are not solely attributed to Uraia but rather that Uraia contributed towards their achievement.

- ***Peaceful elections***

The biggest and most notable success that Uraia and its partners contributed towards according to the review respondents were the peaceful elections held in March 2013. Respondents felt that civic education implemented leading up to the elections significantly contributed to this result. In the aftermath of the post-election violence in 2007, there were many questions as to whether the same outcome would reoccur come 2013 and tensions were high, especially in areas that were heavily affected by the post elections conflict in 2007/8. Working closely with partners at the local level and with support from donors and other stakeholders, Uraia through the Uchaguzi Bora Initiative (UBI) was able to advocate for peaceful elections and emphasize the need for all communities to coexist peacefully. Uraia managed to reach over 1.5m people directly through implementing partners and civic educators (793,606 and 769,120 respectively) and over 10m through a variety of multi-media outlets.

“Through the Uchaguzi Bora Initiative Uraia was able to contribute to making the elections free, fair, credible, participatory and peaceful. The increased voter turnout and the increase in the number of youth who participated successfully in the election is evidence of some of the contribution of Uchaguzi Bora”

The goal of the UBI was to build a critical mass of citizens working to ensure that Kenya’s General Elections were participatory, peaceful, free, fair and credible, demonstrated in the entrenchment of the constitution; and in the realization of justice in the electoral process. More specifically, the UBI sought to support CSOs activities aimed at fostering and expanding citizen participation in the electoral process; promoting peaceful coexistence of communities; entrenching constitutionalism in the electioneering process; enhancing practical mechanism for electing leaders of integrity; enhancing credibility in the judicial system to achieve participatory, peaceful, free, and fair elections; and lobbying, advocacy and policy influencing on electoral issues.



In addition to this, through targeted messages on different medium such as TV, radio, newspaper and the internet, campaigns urging the eligible voters to take part in the electoral process in order to have a say on their desired type of leadership were well received. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) recorded 14.296 million registered voters, up from 13.043 million in 2007. This translated into a record 85.9% casting the ballot up from 69.1% previously. It was a deliberate Uraia strategy to refocus civic/voter education, and media messages activities towards mobilizing citizens to register as voters. It is evident that up until the elections, Uraia and partners activities helped build confidence in the electoral system and the institutions; and promoted peace and reconciliation during the 2013 elections.

- ***Increase in number of people embracing a new constitutional culture***

The success of the Uraia civic education component is best illustrated in the increased citizen awareness on the provisions of the constitution demonstrated in new practices such as public vetting of aspiring leaders, although this was to a small degree. In particular, civic education spurred an increased number of candidates using the court system to address electoral disputes as opposed to inciting their supporters into violence. The Judiciary records 145 petition cases following the 2013 elections, broken down into 56 Members of Parliament, 54 County Assembly Representatives, 20 Governors, 7 Senators, 5 Women Representatives and 3 Speakers of the County Assembly.

In addition, citizens have become more aware of the need to respect the rule of law, and this saw Kenyans accept the ruling by the Supreme Court on the presidential dispute without resulting to violence after the general election held on 4th March 2013.

- ***Increased citizen awareness***

According to 93% respondents, Uraia has contributed significantly to increased citizen awareness (informed and educated public) on a large and diverse set of democratic orientations ranging from basic political knowledge and rights awareness to attitudes about gender, ethnic tolerance and even democratic institutions. The review found that citizens who have interacted with Uraia activities face-to-face are significantly more knowledgeable about politics, more efficacious generally and specifically in regards to the Constitution, constitutional issues and the desirability of public involvement in the constitutional review process, than were similarly “matched” individuals who did not participate in Uraia activities.

This built on what was accomplished under NCEP II where reports showcased there was some influence of NCEP II-Uraia on variables related to Identity and Ethnic Group Relations. Program activities led to significant increases in individuals’ identification as a “Kenyan” relative to their tribal identification which led to significant increases in social tolerance. The events following the 2007 election showed that this dimension is particularly crucial to Kenyan politics and society.



- ***Increased participation of men, women and the marginalised in political processes***

In terms of participation, the key informants and focus group participants were in agreement that the numbers of both women and men taking an interest and actively participating in political processes has been on the rise. The main reason given for this is increased knowledge, especially on citizen's rights and government's roles and responsibilities as per the constitution. As a result, this has made the citizens more confident to engage the leaders from a point of knowledge. Some examples of this are seen in citizen's insisting on being involved or have their representatives involved in decision-making forums, involvement of marginalised and minority stakeholders in decision-making and paying attention to their special needs.

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*"Uraia has reached out to women-friendly organisations as part of their implementing partners and through this has increased interest and participation of women on democracy and governance matters"*

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- ***Improved budgetary oversight and scrutiny***

As part of the civic education and engagement initiatives, with Uraia support, the partners were able to sensitise the public on the need and role of the "mwananchi" (citizen) in ensuring they pay attention to county budgets and expenditure and ensuring there is general accountability and transparency at the county level. The increased vigilance and general knowledge by citizens has pushed the county governments to ensure they have their house in order and have made them more interactive and consultative. Whilst 55% of the respondents expressed satisfaction with the civic education curriculum, a significant 40% were of the opinion there is still more that can be done to increase budgetary oversight and scrutiny in particular and, as a result, improve management. Knowledge on public financial management ranked highest on the wish list.

- ***Increased leadership accountability***

It is the majority (85%) view that Uraia Civic education programme has produced both male and female citizens that advocate and lobby for greater accountability of their elected officials. It was reported that the majority of the people who participated in the civic education programmes have played an active role in mobilizing communities to hold their elected officials accountable. 46.8% of the respondents reported that the Uraia civic education has prepared women and men to demand greater accountability from the leaders, 48.9% of the respondents reported that the Uraia civic education provides basic skills to the women and men to demand accountability from their leadership. However, there is not much evidence that Uraia has helped promote citizen demand for greater promotion of women in leadership.

Following civic and voter education on leadership and integrity, Implementing Partners (IPs) were able to sensitize citizens on the need to vet the aspiring leaders and ensure only those with good track records have their names in the ballot papers. The IP's further supported and trained citizens on how to vet leaders thus instilling the culture of vetting during the period preceding the elections. County Citizen Participatory Forums in Siaya, Makueni, Kilifi and Taita Taveta counties vetted leaders. While the vetting forums may not have been conducted systemically across the 47 counties,

it is evident from the election results that Kenyan citizens were no longer going to accept the 'business as usual' as a large number of the old crop of politicians were not re-elected, with Kenyans bringing on board over 70% new political leaders.

- ***Institutional transformation***

There is some evidence that Uraia has helped facilitate democratic transformation in Kenya. The Trust invested 269 million Kenya Shillings, in institutions (especially CBO's and CSO's) to carry out civic education, and to empower citizens to directly engage in civic engagement. An example of this is the Manderla mediation council and women's group which, through Uraia support, has made a contribution to raising informed, educated and empowered citizens on matters of the constitution, the electoral process, and devolution.

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"Whereas we still have some way to go in strengthening our organisation, without Uraia's support our institution would not be where it is are at the moment. Manderla mediation council" who said this?

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Through enhanced citizen engagement with duty-bearers, institutions in charge of elections including the IEBC; the Judiciary, Parliament, and the Police have improved relationships with citizens and citizen groups. Over 60% of those interviewed highly commended Uraia on the role it has played in motivating institutional reforms. That said, 37.6% of the total respondents did not think Uraia has done an exceptional job, and were of the opinion more needs to be done to get majority of these institution's capacity to acceptable levels. Many respondents went as far to question whether it was Uraia's role to assist in reforming state institutions.

### **Mobile-Survey findings**

Majority of the survey participants were between 18 to 24 years old with 64% being male and 36% being female. The key findings were:

- 92% are familiar with the concept of civic education and 78% have regular access to civic education;
- Currently churches and mosques, media and finally schools in that order are the most popular sources for civic education however when asked where they would prefer to get civic education, churches, mosques and schools ranked equally high with media coming third.
- From a religious stand point, churches were more popular with the female respondents whereas mosques were more popular with men ;
- Out of the 78% who have regular access to civic education, 95% stated that civic education has had some positive influence on their knowledge and behaviour. Key behavioural change has been in voting patterns and increased interest and engagement in democracy and governance issues more so through use of technology;
- Two of the biggest factors that have prevented this demographic from participating in civic or public matters are lack of time due to work and family commitments and the cost implications associated with participation such as travel costs. Another factor that also ranked high was the lack of trust in the process and outcome as they believe those involved are there to look out for their own selfish interests;

### **Moving forwards**

- At later point in the period of this strategic plan, there is an opportunity to survey this panel again to explore deeper into these issues in addition to finding out more on other areas of interest to Uraia.



### 3.3 Were these the right things to do?

This section looks at strategic relevance through an analysis of a) the challenge (s) Uraia is trying to address; b) the theory of change which outlines the overall approach for overcoming the challenge; and c) the actions and interventions chosen to address these challenges.

#### The challenge

According to the strategic plan 2011/2015, pushing forward the democratic transformation of Kenya has not been an easy process. Citizens having been dominated by the political elite and ordinary Kenyans becoming increasingly frustrated with their leaders and disillusioned with their institutions<sup>4</sup>. The last decade has seen this situation increasingly challenged by the public. Some of the problems highlighted in the strategic plan include:

- a) Corruption and impunity by leaders;
- b) Ethnicised politics;
- c) Undemocratic political system;
- d) Poor public service delivery
- e) Irresponsive, unaccountable and disengaged government;
- f) Practices of expropriation;
- g) History of patronage and clientism;

An analysis of the materials used in civic education revealed that elections, the new constitution and devolution has been the core subjects covered in the civic education initiatives with some of the challenges highlighted above receiving limited explicit mention and attention in the materials.

#### Uraia's approach - Theory of Change (ToC)

To address the challenges posed above, Uraia, through its strategic plan, committed to making a major contribution to developing an informed and educated citizenry in Kenya that addresses its contextual realities and which then leads on to that citizenry being engaged in various reform activities at various levels.

The underlying assumption is that when people are well informed that their efforts to bring change will bring reward and they will get the kind of government they want – an accountable and responsive one – that they get engaged. Through its interventions of creating an informed and educated public, Uraia seeks to develop men and women having a sense of belonging and identity that is strongly shaped by being one people in one nation – and which supersedes rather than replaces all other more local senses of belonging and identities.

An analysis of the theory of change highlighted some expected consequences of the approach as well as some consequences that were unexpected.

- a) **Expected consequences** – Some of the anticipated consequences of the approach to develop a critical mass of civically educated citizens who can demand and secure reforms include:

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<sup>4</sup> Uraia Trust strategic plan 2011-2015

increased awareness on rights and responsibilities of the duty bearers which has resulted in increased oversight and scrutiny at both central and county government levels. This has subsequently led to increased accountability and transparency.

**b) Unexpected consequences :**

- i. One of the major unexpected consequences was the reluctance to vote based on issues. As in the past, voting happened largely on ethnic lines despite all the civic education initiatives talking on issue based voting that had taken place prior to the elections taking place;
- ii. As also noted during the two previous phases on NCEP where 4.5 to 5.5 million people were reached, this has not adequately translated into a noticeable increase in sustained and committed public engagement and therefore did not bring about the changes desired in the country;

These findings beg the question on the effectiveness / validity of creating an informed and educated public as a tool for bringing about democratic transformation. Whilst this approach has been successful, it was suggested that the strategy should also identify other initiatives that complement education and knowledge sharing.

During the focus group discussions, the following issues were highlighted that have a bearing in the bringing about desired change but have not been given due attention:

- Myths and negative ethnicity;
- Historical injustices;
- Economic development;
- Literacy levels;
- Civic education at primary and secondary levels;

**Uraia's actions / Interventions**

Uraia's strategy focused on civic education and civic engagement. These focus areas formed two pillars out of three with the third focusing on Uraia's internal Institutional transformation. Within these three pillars, there are 18 objective areas that were identified by looking at Uraia from the perspectives of beneficiaries, internal processes, learning, and growth and resources.

Initial feedback from the review respondents on the objective interventions and an analysis on the organisational performance in achieving the intended outcome has revealed the following:

- Despite the objective areas having coherence (building upon each other), Uraia seems to be struggling to implement all 18 objectives effectively and efficiently. Staff members interviewed indicated that Uraia has not been able to adequately cover all objective areas and also expressed scepticism on Uraia's capacity to effectively undertake some of the objectives such as democratic transformation of partner organisations. This was further reinforced by the performance scores from the external respondents;

- It was repeated by several interviewees that the Trust's primary role should be that of a facilitator and not an implementer. If this is the case, it will necessitate a review of some of the objective areas such as capacity building, organisation development and training activities as they squarely lie with an implementing type of organisation. In addition to this, components such as organisation structure will also heavily rely on the core mandate of the organisation;
- Uraia's monitoring framework is not robust enough. The framework focusses largely on activity level interventions and does not outline output and outcome levels explicitly for ease of monitoring. There are no targets indicated for the indicators and instead what is outlined is overall timeline. As mentioned in the section on barriers to effectiveness, this has inhibited continuous learning and repositioning. This is discussed in greater detail in the upcoming M&E section.

#### **Civic education specific comments**

- "There is need to remain partisan in our CE initiatives";
- Timing of civic education initiatives is key;
- Focus more on quality than quantity – the most critical elements on quality are materials and the message carriers (individuals or other medium such as TV and Radio) ;
- Monitor attitudes and perceptions in addition to knowledge levels

#### **Civic engagement specific comments**

- Some of the reasons given for low engagement levels are
  - a. Lack of time;
  - b. Cost implications associated with participation;
  - c. Lack of trust in the process and outcome.

#### ***Relevance of design***

Uraia's strategic plan's three-pronged approach was chosen to ensure there is a level of intervention at every point of the governance and democracy results chain. According to staff members, this approach has enabled them address issues in a systematic and comprehensive manner which has increased overall effectiveness as a result.

#### ***Relevance to national needs and priorities***

The strategic plan strategy and design focusing on key interventions and areas of focus has proven it was totally relevant to the needs of the country. This strategic plan was heavily informed by the study undertaken by Society for International Development (SID).

The study was premised on the desire of Uraia, UNDP - Amkeni and UN Women – Usawa to work collaboratively in the areas of civic education and engagement. The three institutions share a

common agenda that mainly focuses on civic education, civic engagement, gender and governance, and institutional transformation to safeguard and broaden the democratic space and good governance in Kenya; as well as facilitate transparency and accountability in this sector.

More specifically, the strategic plan's thematic areas of focus were based on knowledge and experience of Uraia and its partners and were fully cognisant of the high priority areas. Evidence of this is seen in the high priority given to ensuring there were peaceful elections, peaceful coexistence before and after the elections and smooth transition from the centralised system of government to the devolved government system. The civic education programme rolled out by the UBI was relevant to the election period, it covered voter registration and mobilization on the election-day; leadership and integrity, good governance, devolution and elective positions, cohesion and nationhood in the pre-election period.

The caveat to this was that, whilst it was unanimously agreed that peaceful elections and coexistence was the biggest priority, 30% of the respondents felt that over the same period, Uraia did not engage adequately on other spheres of governance such as rooting democracy nationally. This particular sphere is however being now addressed by a recently-launched programme.

In addition, the strategic plan has been based on implementation of the new constitution which has been highly relevant since 2010. This choice was validated in needs assessment carried out as part of the review where 93% of the respondents ranked highly knowledge of the constitution especially on citizen rights and the roles and responsibilities of both the duty bearers.

### ***Relevance to donor priorities***

In light of the shift from Uraia being a programme to it becoming a trust (national organisation – owned and run by Kenyans), lesser emphasis is being placed on donor priorities and more attention has been put on the trust addressing locally-determined national priorities and pressing needs. That being said, donors still play a critical role and are a much valued partner whose strategy, priorities and interventions would need synchronising with those of Uraia and its partners.

An analysis of several donor Kenya country programmes (DFID, CIDA, SIDA, USAID) revealed that thematic focus areas of governance and democratic transformation ranks high in their agenda. An overview of this is found in the annex section of this report

*Caveat* – A number of donors are refocussing their programmes and Uraia will need to be cognisant of the direction shift in order to effectively position itself appropriately.

### **3.4 Value for money / efficiency**

The majority of the respondents, 67.3% agree that Uraia has invested time and resources in partner CSOs/CBOs, such as through partner trainings, skilled personnel that can deliver the work, and internal systems, exchange visits, and production of management documents such as manuals. The programme has also facilitated meetings between partners and the communities, and provided well-trained, skilled personnel that can deliver the work. Most significantly, Uraia has effectively supported implementing partners financially and made periodic visits to monitor their activities.

With a USD 9 million budget, Uraia was able to reach at least **1 million people directly**, and at least **10 million indirectly**. Approximately KES 150 million was utilized on media outreach. The question however remains whether more could have been achieved with the same amount of resources. Both Uraia and the partner organisations suggested that if the funds disbursements had been made on time, the interventions would have been more effective and would have possibly had an even bigger impact. An example given for this was that the cost of media was high since they were engaged at peak season (close to the elections) and had this been done earlier it would have been much cheaper.

The Trust put forward the best structures to effectively and efficiently manage their activities in the most cost effective way. Up to 80% of the funds have been utilised. The 20% unabsorbed funds were attributed to late disbursements. The Programme funded a total of 62 partners in what is a typically risky sector- working with grassroots organisations, at different levels of capacity. Major problems were faced by only 3 of the partners.

It is also worth noting that Uraia faced high financial risk which is typical in the governance sector in Kenya, where funding mechanisms are short-term and largely focused towards supporting elections. This short-term nature of support impedes longer-term planning. During the period under review, at times funding cycles were not consistent, which brought with it additional risk on Uraia's part as the partners organisations were relying on them for funds.

### 3.5 Equity

Under the civic education component, it was mentioned repeatedly that the strategic plan interventions should consider the needs of the special interest groups (women, youth, minorities, marginalised, disabled). The intervention logic for this component read "to have an informed and educated public on katiba (constitution) especially women, youth and marginalised groups". The review found that more attention was paid to gender with focus put on facilitating both men and women to equally access civic education and have the agency and opportunity to effectively participate in civic engagement initiatives and were able to do so effectively. According to the key informants, these initiatives have been rather adhoc and intermittent and they were of the opinion that in order to bring the special interest groups on board, Uraia needs to have a clear targeting strategy to ensure that they are included in programming. To facilitate this, data on equity will need to be monitored.

### 3.6 Monitoring & Evaluation

Review findings show that the Uraia Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning system can be improved. Currently, the MEL system is not well understood and owned by all the staff. Whereas there is a staff member who is an M&E full-time equivalent, there needs to be in place with a shared understanding of everyone's roles and responsibilities across the organisation. Another concern is on the quality of the M&E framework. The framework has focussed mostly on activity level interventions with little correlation to outputs and outcomes and the indicators are not robust enough. An example of this is that the indicators did not have explicit annual targets and only gave "year 1 to 5" as the target.

Currently, monitoring is done through:

- Reporting/analysis – obtaining and analysing documentation from the programme that provides information on progress (annual or quarterly progress reports, work plans etc). These reports come from all implementing partners both state and non-state actors working on civic education and civic engagement. These reports also include financial management reports.
- Validation – checking or verifying whether the reported progress is accurate or not (field visits, external assessment, client feedback or surveys, etc.;
- Participation – obtaining feedback from partners and beneficiaries on progress and proposed actions (focus group discussions, steering committees, stakeholders meeting, etc.

Reporting is done on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis. In addition to this there is an implementer's forum which is organized twice every year, and brings together all the implementing partners and civic educators to discuss progress, identify gaps, challenges and lessons learnt. Recommendations from these forums inform the programming for the subsequent period.

#### **Additional tools to be included in 2014/2016 work plan**

- a) Indicator Performances Tracking Table (IPTT) will be utilized to continuously assess how progress is being made in the attainment of outputs/outcomes. Uraia will develop an Indicator Performance Tracking Table for the programme that will capture all quantitative indicators drawn from the logical framework. Data from different reports will be used to fill in the information in this table, and facilitate tracking of progress.
- b) Automated M & E system – Uraia is planning to acquire an automated M & E system for efficient and effective performance management.

### **3.7 Sustainability**

To assess sustainability, the review's main focus areas were financial and programmatic aspects.

In order to achieve its goals and objectives, Uraia needs to be adequately resourced. Just how much "adequately" means is yet another question that can only be answered once the scope of Uraia's interventions is explicitly outlined.

Currently, Uraia relies heavily on donor support to finance its programmes and activities. With donors increasingly tightening their budgets and some of them shifting priority thematic areas of focus, Uraia could find itself in an uncomfortable financial situation if reliance on donor funding was to continue. Respondents were of the view that funding sources will need to be diversified with the ultimate objective being to have Uraia able to fund its activities through a healthy mix of internally generated revenue and external funding.

*Programmatically* - It was indicated especially during the key informant interviews that in order for Uraia to remain relevant programmatically, it must intervene in areas that are not only current but also in areas where others are inadvertently shying away from. Uraia will need to differentiate itself from other similar organisations and carve out a niche area for the Trust. An example given during

the focus group discussions and repeated during the validation session is that Uraia should aim to be a thought / opinion leader (becoming an authority on relevant topics by delivering the answers to the biggest questions on the minds of your target audience) on matters of democracy and governance not only in Kenya but also within the region. This would entail focussing on knowledge generation and brokering and putting in place the right structure, skills, staff and systems.

## 4. Recommendations

In this section, we outline the key recommendations. These recommendations have been grouped into programmatic recommendations and organisational recommendations.

### 4.1 Programmatic recommendations

#### a) **Uraia should be a facilitating, and not an implementing Trust**

Based on Delta's analysis of the trust's strengths and weaknesses, coupled with the feedback from various stakeholders, Delta recommends that Uraia moves away from being an implementing organisation and focuses solely on facilitation.

Some of the activities that are implementing in nature include the ones under the objectives on a) producing skilled civic educators; b) developing CSO's and CBO's; and c) capacity building, organisational development and Training. Doing both has stretched Uraia's resources and affected overall programme delivery.

The trust should capitalize on the large number of county level CSOs and CBOs to cover the quantity aspect (geographic reach) with Uraia focusing on the quality of its programmes through in-depth research, thought leadership and knowledge-brokering (bringing people together, building relationships and sharing ideas and evidence that help stakeholders do their jobs better). Uraia should be the "go to" institution / reference point on all matters pertaining to civic education and engagement.

#### b) **Uraia should revise its strategic plan to make it more realistic.**

The review recommends that Uraia narrows down the number of strategic objectives. Whilst the objectives give comprehensive coverage, an analysis of the performance under each of these objectives has revealed that whilst performance in some of them was above average, in others it was poor. This poor performance is largely driven by lack of capacity (staff numbers and technical expertise) to adequately undertake the set initiatives. Uraia should focus on the objectives that have the most meaningful impact and those tied to the trust's strengths and core competencies.

#### c) **Uraia should focus on 2-3 programmatic areas within the realm of civic education.**

The Strategic plan review has disclosed a positive ambition on the part of Uraia to cover as many thematic areas as possible. However, given the aforementioned organisational constraints, the large number of actors in the field of civic education and, most important of all, the complexity of the thematic area of "civic education", Uraia needs to find its niche by focusing on 2-3 programmatic areas where it can be most effective and produce a lasting impact for the Kenyan society. When making the important strategic choice, the review recommends that the key determinants be the high impact areas, areas where Uraia has a comparative advantage (staffing, skillsets, systems, networks, etc.), the current socio-political context in the country, as well as the suggestions made by stakeholders, key informants and governance bodies. The role of the advisory council can be especially important in strategic guidance given the members breadth of experience. To complement



this, Uraia should improve the quality of coordination with other partners to increase the overall impact.

Following discussions with key informants, stakeholders and other relevant actors, Delta has identified the following areas as ones where Uraia can have most impact and ones it should therefore, focus on:

- **Devolution**, in particular the functioning (integrity – work for common good, transparency, accountability) of the local bodies and elected officials. This area can also include the administration of policies at the local level (which involves public participation and provision of services).
- Education in **constitutional rights and duties for citizens and elected officials** (implementation and internalisation of Constitution of Kenya 2010), with the focus on issues which are not directly related to voters' education. Namely, many observers perceive Uraia as the primary provider of voters' education. This is not bad per se, but the next election is not scheduled until 2017/2018. In the meantime, there are many areas that can be covered under this thematic area – citizenship (in particular, the entitlements of citizenship/what it means to be a “good” citizen); the Bill of Rights; leadership and integrity; public service, etc. This can include the role of the elected officials at the national level and shifting of their focus from private gain to common good.
- **Issue-based politics and tribalism** – this may be the most important political issue that Uraia (and Kenya) could be focusing on. Kenya lacks real programmatic discussions in the public sphere, where most “issues” are discussed and decided on the basis of belonging to an ethnic group, rather than adherence to political ideologies and agendas. Uraia can play an important role in educating the public of importance to turn to real problems, such as employment, development, communal policies, etc., rather than supporting a candidate because “s/he is one of our own”. This is essential for Kenya's development.
- **Transformation of political processes** – with the primary focus on transparency and accountability of political parties and greater inclusion of citizens in political processes – citizen engagement (at both the national and county levels)
- **The position and education of women and men (gender component), minorities, PWDs and marginalised communities** – from the perspective of civic education for both these groups and also the entire society that should be supportive of their inclusion in the Kenyan public life. One thing is very important here – namely, there are many organisations already dealing with the various aspects of inclusion of these groups in the public life, so in case Uraia decides to pay more attention to this problematic, it needs to make sure not to duplicate efforts already made elsewhere. For example, Uraia can talk about the necessity to make everyday activities easier for PWDs (maybe in partnership with other organisations).
- **National unity and cohesion** – with the focus on how Kenyans treat Kenyans in the common public sphere, e.g. when providing services, participating in traffic, dealing with complaints, economic disparities or different geographic and cultural

backgrounds. This is important because without the national cohesion and Kenyans becoming kinder to each other, it is difficult to expect significant progress in the country's development, and it is less probable that Kenyans will enjoy the fruits of development efforts.

Again, these is not an all-inclusive list of possible areas that Uraia could focus on in the forthcoming period and in order to be successful in its efforts, Delta recommends to Uraia that, in the first instance, it focuses on 2-3 of the above programmatic areas. This can be further expanded upon the final evaluation of the programme and drafting of the strategic plan for the following four years. The rationale for this recommendation is that this phase of the programme expires next year, which will prompt additional discussions on the strategic orientation of the organisation, but also the fact that a strategic decision on “what we want to do” needs to include considerations related to research and sufficient expertise, knowledge and learning, monitoring and evaluation, as well as human and material resources necessary to deliver good results.

**d) Uraia needs to put in place a robust monitoring, evaluation and learning system.**

Uraia's MEL system is generally weak and does not provide good data for decision-making and accountability. Delta recommends this is strengthened going forward. Delta further recommends that the following areas be addressed:

- Results chain – The visual diagrams that maps out the intended pathway to improved outcomes in the form of a time-sequenced chain. Sometimes also referred to as the causal chain;
- Indicators of success – Also at times referred to as progress markers. They give an indication on how we are progressing towards achieving our goals and objectives;
- Tools and templates used to capture information (both quantitative and qualitative) – synching of IP's reporting with Uraia's reporting needs;

Such an MEL system needs to correspond to Uraia's programmes, as well as the structural and technical needs of the organisation. This includes a more comprehensive and responsive monitoring system that will guide the organisation towards the optimal results while the programmes are still being implemented. A detailed monitoring and evaluation plan would allow Uraia to assess the extent to which its objectives have been realised (in particular through a set of concrete, relevant and actionable indicators) and allow it to develop a long-term, yet flexible strategy for how to achieve the change that is necessary in Kenya. Uraia should also develop a tracking database for individuals and groups who have been trained in civic education. It will be important to bear in mind that changing behaviour, attitudes and perceptions takes longer to achieve therefore they should be monitored at outcome and impact levels. The M&E system should also factor in continuous learning and improvement and feeding learning into decision making.

- e) **Uraia should also revisit and review its theory of change.** It is recommended that such a review of the theory of change assumptions:

- Explore change and how to get there;
- Question the assumptions behind the chosen approach and interventions;
- Look for connections between desired outcome and the activities;

The strategic plan review found out that despite extensive civic education initiatives, this has not translated into sustained and committed public engagement nor has this influenced actions such as voting patterns. This is a major finding as it waters down the guiding assumption that an informed and educated public will engage and help bring about the desired change in Kenya. As part of the theory of change exercise above, Uraia should explore the validity of recommendations to pay (more) attention to the following areas by incorporating / addressing them in their initiatives:

- **Myths and negative ethnicity** – Use the media to demystify some of the ethnic myths promote positive ethnicity;
- **Historical injustices** – Lobby for full implementation of recommendations from commissions such as the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, The Ndungu land report<sup>5</sup>, Constitution Implementation Commission reports;
- **Economic development** – advocate for equity in economic development;
- **Literacy levels** – Advocate for increase in literacy especially for the senior citizens;

- f) **Uraia needs to further improve the quality of its education materials.**

The review recommends that Uraia ensures that all materials used are, as a bare minimum, gender neutral, cater for the needs of the special interest groups such as the disabled and are culturally sensitive to minority and marginalized communities.

- g) **Uraia needs to improve its usage of the media and technology.**

Delta recommends that Uraia capitalises on the growing mobile and Internet access in Kenya, in addition to other technologies to widen its reach and increase interaction with different stakeholder groups including the general public. Potential avenues include:

- Enhance Uraia website interactivity;
- Use of blogs;
- Twitter;
- Facebook;
- Mobile survey;

- h) **Uraia needs to improve its strategies and results within the strategic pillars “civic education” and “civic engagement”.**

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<sup>5</sup> <http://cemusstudent.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Ndungu-Land-Report.pdf>

#### **Civic education:**

- Civic education at primary and secondary levels – Uraia should lobby for inclusion of civic education in primary and secondary schools curriculum. It was argued that if civic education is started at an early age this will help shape and solidify personal thoughts and opinions and reduce the chances of coercion into different political affiliations based on aspects such as tribal inclinations;
- Uraia should pay attention to its target audiences' attitudes and perceptions in addition to knowledge levels. More on this point would be useful

#### **Civic engagement:**

- The review recommends that Uraia exploit mechanisms through which it can get people to effectively participate. The trust needs to think through (logic, assumptions and risks) on how opinions/ sentiments captured in such medium will then be used to influence / bring about the desired reforms;
- Another deterrent to civic engagement is often the lack of trust in the process and its outcome. A deeper analysis of underlying reasons for the public mistrust needs to be undertaken and approaches to address this problem developed.

## **4.2 Organisational recommendations**

### **a) Uraia needs to further improve its staff's specific skillsets.**

To ensure the staff is adequately equipped to deliver, there will be a need for continuous learning. The reviewers recommend undertaking a skills mapping and matching exercise and initiation of internal cross training and mentorship programmes to enhance both institutional and individual learning. Link here to the learning points in the previous MEL section.

### **b) Uraia needs to strengthen the financial sustainability of its programmes.**

The financial position of the trust is not ideal bearing in mind the dependence on donor funding which currently accounts for over 50 per cent of total funding. There is, therefore, a need to diversify sources of funding to reduce the risk of shortfalls. In addition to this, coming up with an internal source of revenue to supplement other sources is advisable. Key recommendations on this are:

- Develop a fundraising and sustainability strategy – the funding initiatives should adequately address all pillars within the strategic plan;
- Look to corporate citizens as an alternative source of funding;
- Crowd funding - tap into the diaspora and local growing middle class for alternative funding. The caveat to this is that Uraia would need to be prepared to become increasingly accountable to the public – transparent operations, readily available and easily accessible records, etc.

c) **Uraia should make better use of new technologies and innovation.**

As mentioned previously, the potential impact of digital technology is high in good governance. That said, organisations should fully embrace digital channels but should do so in line with their own unique opportunities. Delta recommends that Uraia identifies what digital opportunities have the potential to reshape its strategy and operations. We recommend looking into the following areas:

- Decision making – This will entail identifying sources of using data and advanced analytics that will improve real time management of information and decision making;
- Connectivity – This will entail identifying digital products and services that will enhance connectivity with Uraia’s target audience in the most effective and efficient manner;
- Innovation – This entails identifying tools and mechanisms that can innovatively improve Uraia’s products, services and operational models.

d) **Uraia should make better use of its current network and form new partnerships.**

During the course of its existence as both a programme and now a trust, Uraia has developed and nurtured operational and strategic relationships with different partners. These partners play a critical role in enlarging the number of players involved in the democratic governance space in addition to sharing knowledge and experiences and resources. Some of these partners include government programmes such as Kenya National Integrated Civic Education programme, donor programmes such as Amkeni and Usawa and local CSO’s such as the Consortia members. We recommend that Uraia:


- Formalises relationships with complementary organisations;
- Ensures the combined consortia has a national outlook and reach;
- Ensures the consortium can effectively reach out to all target groups including the special interest groups;
- The roles and targets of each consortia partner will need to be set explicitly and progress systematically monitored;

## 5. Conclusions

The analysis shows that the trust has a number of achievements to its credit as part of the realisation of its strategic plan.

The partnerships brought together the right partners. The strategy contained important and pertinent themes which delivered quality support that made a difference. The credibility of the Uraia brand and the in-country staff meant that relationships of trust were established. Ownership, relationships and support were all done well. A model for operating as a trust has been established – and proven – and as much as their still some refinement needed that is a major achievement. This is a work in progress and will continue to be improved as the trust continues to learn and adapt to different micro and macro conditions.

An overview of what needs to be maintained, improved and done away with is highlighted below.



In the short term (0 to 6 months), as we move towards the final phase of the strategic plan's period, there is still an opportunity to look into some of the issues raised which can be addressed as priorities with the rest to be addressed in the next strategic plan's period. Some of the key areas we recommend Uraia to focus on over the next six months are:

1. Uraia should focus on its primary role as a facilitating organisation;
2. Uraia should narrow down the number of its programmatic areas (maximum 2 to 3 over the remaining period of the strategic plan), focussing on its own strengths and comparative advantages;

3. Uraia should focus on the programmatic issues where its engagement can result in greatest impact for the Kenyan society;
4. Uraia should develop a funding strategy in order to ensure sustainability of its programmes;
5. Uraia should develop a robust MEL action plan in order to:
  - Strengthen accountability;
  - Ensure better learning across strategic pillars, objectives and strategic partners;
  - Ground its decision-making on available evidence;
  - Use its results to establish Uraia as the leader in the aforementioned programmatic areas.
  - Use the evidence to market / “sell” Uraia;

## Annexes



## Objectives Analysis

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
<b>Institutional transformation</b>	Facilitating democratic transformation of institutions working in and with CEE.	3	This work took long to be operationalised. As such it is at its formative stages and needs to grow.	<b>4</b> 63% said Uraia has done so successfully. 37% said Uraia hasn't been so successful in this regard. The 37% who were of the opinion that Uraia hadn't been so successful cited time and staff capacity as a major constraint. In addition, there is no appropriate monitoring framework in place to determine just how much democratic transformation has occurred.
<b>Quality CE provided to men and women</b>	Uraia should deliver quality civic education which implies multiple exposures with quality and gender sensitive materials taught in a practical and informative way	3	The 13 week module which was supposed to ensure that quality civic education is provided has not been operationalized yet this was caused by late receipt of funds. "Uraia has still not been able to achieve the multiple exposures it had envisioned and materials so far are still very gender neutral"	<b>4</b> 90% rated the quality of civic education as being above average. The respondents indicated that Uraia employs a versatile approach in development and design of its civic education program, e.g. use of facilitative workshops carried out by Uraia partners across the country. "Delivery of civic education was also termed as innovative through using medium such as skits. That said, the respondents said the materials are not fully sensitive to cultural and special interest group's needs e.g. the disabled people.
<b>Increased capacity for effective participation</b>	Those educated should have both the agency and opportunity to participate and to do so effectively.	3	So far the civic education has not translated to civic engagement. Through the civic education forums Uraia needs to incorporate providing practical mechanisms for engaging	<b>4</b> The ratings were split 46% to 48% respectively between those who agreed that those capacitated had both adequate agency and opportunity to participate effectively vis a vis those who disagreed. The major concern expressed here was that civic education has not

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
			with governance issues	resulted in increased civic engagement. The mechanisms for engagement are not known understood or trusted to deliver expected outcomes.
<b>Increased capacity for men and women to demand accountability</b>	Uraia should help men and women demand and get accountability as part of their engagement.	2	Some vetting work was done during Uchaguzi Bora but this was very small and localised. Devolution presents the opportunity to grow this work and Uraia will need to make use of this opportunity.	<b>4</b> In this case ratings were also split 45% to 49% respectively between those who agreed Uraia has effectively helped men and women demand and get accountability vis a vis those who indicated Uraia has done an average job. Credit was given to Uraia for helping articulate the roles and responsibilities of both the duty bearers and the rights holders which has instilled confidence in demanding for accountability. Respondents were of the opinion that civic education needs to also cover extensively technical issues such as public financial management where people are less conversant and get hoodwinked by technical jargon and details.
<b>Increased opportunity for men, women, youth, PWD's, minorities and marginalised groups</b>	Uraia should focus on bringing the special interest groups on board. These groups will be targeted as part of the groups to be educated.	2	This has been rather adhoc and intermittent. In order to bring special interest groups on board, Uraia needs to have a clear targeting strategy to ensure that they are included in programming.  "These has been done however the PWDS were the least supported compared to	<b>3</b> 50% of the respondents indicated that Uraia has put a lot of emphasis on special interest groups (SIG's) whilst 40% were of the opinion that the emphasis put was average. The 40% said that some groups have not been involved as they should have been. One respondent said "Uraia are not intentional and well-coordinated and their interventions are not purposeful in giving SIG's a stronger voice and increasing their involvement and engagement".

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
			the other groups”	
<b>Institutional transformation leading on reforms established</b>	Establishing a national level organisation	4	Uraia is recognised as the national civic education organisation but it is still to establish itself as a leading national organisation in democratic transformation	<b>4</b> 77% said Uraia has played a significant role in CE and its change to being a trust should further help augment this. By supporting the work of consortia Uraia has played a critical role in enabling a national dialogue on reforms, rights and responsibilities. That said, there is not national level type of organisation. Some respondents expressed doubt on how much more contribution could be expected from a national level type of organisation compared to the consortium model.
<b>Producing skilled civic educators</b>	Uraia to identify quality people, train them, and continue to support them through CSO’s in their efforts to reach a million years.	4	Uraia has been able to identify over 300 individuals and train them to conduct civic education. This number needs to grow and the quality of civic education that they have so far received needs to deepen, given that so far the training was primarily on elections and a bit on devolution	<b>5</b> 90% of the respondents were in agreement that Uraia has done a tremendous job especially identifying and training civic educators. However, this has been done in some areas with other areas having not received the same level of attention. Uraia cited wide geographic coverage and poor transport infrastructure as the main reasons for this difference in reach. FGD participants indicated that these numbers are still not enough to bring about the desired change and would need to be multiplied.

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
<b>Facilitating inclusive and effective citizen engagement</b>	Uraia to excel in understanding how citizens can best engage	3	Uraia needs to build a body of knowledge and expertise in understanding how people engage and what motivates them in order to tailor capacity building that speaks to peoples motivations	<b>4</b> 62% indicated that Uraia has been <i>somewhat</i> effective in facilitating citizen engagement. 80% indicated that more could have been done to better understand the best way to increase engagement from the different demographics.  Quote - "The mechanisms for engagement can be increased / diversified in order to capture various groups and cultures"
<b>Utilising accountability mechanisms</b>	Uraia should use already provided for mechanisms to hold female and male leaders and duty bearers accountable.	2	Uraia is yet to use accountability mechanisms to hold leaders – male and female – to account in its work. The absence of this has been occasioned by limited internal capacity to do this work.	<b>3</b> Only 10% were of the opinion that Uraia is fully utilising all available mechanisms. The mechanism having prominence is using the court system. Respondents indicated that Uraia has implemented petition training and training of paralegals but more needs to be done to understand other mechanisms and how to best utilise them.  Quote - "Uraia should be more aggressive on this"
<b>Developing civil society organisations</b>	Assist CSO's and CBO's to become more effective.	3	Uraia has done some capacity building for civil society but in order for this to be done effectively Uraia needs to have a coherent capacity building plan in place that will guide this support towards building more effective CSOs	<b>5</b> 80% ranked Uraia above average on their efforts to develop civil society organisations. Respondents indicated that Uraia has capacity building to especially ensure quality information is passed on to the citizens. Uraia's support has been in the form of technical support as well as providing materials. It was indicated that this

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
			and CBOs.  “A lot still needs to be done, as not much support is given to CSOS to become effective but rather support to undertake and implement an Uraia funded project”	needs to be undertaken in a more systematic manner through organised capacity assessments and building initiatives. It was also suggested that Uraia should facilitate cross learning sessions between CSO’s and CBO’s.
<b>Managing consortia, CSO’s and complex programmes</b>	Uraia to excel at keeping everyone (consortia, CSO’s and programmes) on track through an institutional framework	3	Uraia is yet to establish an institutional framework for keeping everyone on track. To a certain extent Uraia has managed to provide leadership on democracy and governance issues but this has not been through a coherent strategic approach	<b>4</b> 79% agreed Uraia is doing a good job managing / interacting with consortia partners. The consortia partners said this needs to be formally organised and well-coordinated to ensure maximum gains.  Quote – “sharing of strategic plans amongst consortia partners will go a long way in maximising synergies and increasing efficiency and reach”
<b>Multimedia material and communications</b>	Uraia to invest in an effective gender sensitive multimedia strategy that supports its programmes. All materials should be practical and available online.	3	Uraia will need to articulate a multimedia strategy that enables it support gender sensitive programming. Currently all its multimedia content is gender neutral and the use of online platforms is still suboptimal.	<b>4</b> 70% of the respondents were satisfied with gender and cultural sensitiveness of the materials. Those unsatisfied indicated the materials are gender neutral and will need to be improved. They also said there is a need for Uraia to develop and execute a media engagement strategy.
<b>Research and tracking</b>	Uraia to invest in gathering and conducting gender responsive research in key areas. It should also track what is going on in	4	This is an area that Uraia needs to grow in expertise to undertake	<b>3</b> Uraia was rated average on its research undertakings and general knowledge brokering. There is no research arm within the

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
	areas pertaining to goals of the trust and hopes of the nation.			<p>organisation and with staff fully occupied, the internal capacity to undertake this has been a constraint.</p> <p>Quote – “Uraia should consider having an internship programme where some of the interns can focus on research activities”</p>
<b>Advocacy and networking</b>	Uraia should both lead and support advocacy as part of its engagement. It should help participants to lobby and advocate locally.	4	Uraia needs to articulate its advocacy strategy in order to be able to support and lead in this area.	<p><b>5</b></p> <p>85% of the respondents felt that Uraia has played an active role in both leading and supporting in advocacy efforts. Respondents indicated that these activities will need to be better coordinated and an overall strategy developed.</p> <p>Quote - “They have been at the forefront in petitioning the government on various emergent issues such as the PBO Act.”</p>
<b>Capacity building, organisation development and training</b>	Uraia should invest time and resources in those its supporting. Uraia should strengthen local actors to play their role in modelling and facilitating democratic transformation and practices.	3	Uraia’s previous programming had little in the way of a clear strategy or funding for strengthening local actors in facilitating democratic transformation. A clear capacity building strategy needs to be in place with clear deliverables.	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>72% of the respondents felt Uraia has done a good job investing resources and time to capacitate local actors. Some of the respondents indicated they have received financial support in addition to Uraia undertaking periodic visits to monitor their progress. It was agreed that more can be done to develop a clear capacity building approach with an exit point / plan.</p> <p>Quote - “A commendable job has been done to help CSOs and CBOs through training of staff</p>

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
				and providing technical assistance.”
<b>High skilled trustees and staff. Good systems</b>	Uraia should have in place skilled staff, quality systems including MEL systems and a good governance framework.	4	Uraia has staff that focus on MEL but needs to enhance this capacity across the organisation so that each programme is incorporating these systems in the implementation of its work.	<p><b>4</b></p> <p>Staff quality was rated above average by 70% of the respondents. The respondents indicated the staff are of a high calibre and have extensive organisational and environmental knowledge. Whilst finance and procurement systems were judged to be good, MEL systems were rated below average at 43%. Staff members indicated that in addition to developing the MEL system, staff will need to be trained on how to use the system and their individual roles and responsibilities towards ensuring Uraia gets maximum benefit out of the system.</p> <p>Quote - “They all understand the mandate of the organization so well that they have been able to transfer the same knowledge to civic educators and implementing partners.”</p> <p>Quote - “In as far as their systems go they can learn a lot from Act and Diakonia.”</p>

Objective	Description	Uraia staff Self-assessment rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)	Self-assessment Rationale given	Respondents rating 1 to 6 = 1 (Poor) to 6 (exceptional)
<b>Proving impact</b>	Uraia's credibility which should attract and retain resources.	3	Presently there is not a very clear MEL system that is understood and owned by all the staff. This needs to be in place with a shared understanding across the organisation.	<b>5</b> Uraia was rated as highly credible by 98% of the respondents. However credibility will need to go hand in hand with proving results and as such M&E needs to be strengthened. Respondents indicated the credibility has been brought about by its past activities as a programme and its prominence nationally
<b>Diversify and grow funding streams</b>	Uraia to effectively market its programmes, diversify its donor base and deepen the commitment of donors including private sector to the trust.	2	Uraia needs to articulate and action a clear sustainability strategy that includes fundraising from development partners, the private sector as well as looking at what services it can 'sell' in order to ensure that it has a constant flow of resources to undertake the work that is important to it.  "A lot still needs to be done, as not much support is given to CSOS to become effective but rather support to undertake and implement an Uraia funded project"	<b>3</b> Uraia was rated slightly above average at 60% on its ability to diversify funds and deepen donor commitments. The biggest concern is that there is no funding strategy in place to coordinate fund raising activities and interventions.



## Sample ToC Approach<sup>6</sup>

Area	Description
<b>Summary Statement</b> <sup>7</sup>	One sentence describing the expected link between the intervention, the change process and the ultimate goal, often given as an “If...then...” statement. <sup>8</sup>
<b>Problem Statement</b>	Identify the problem and examine its underlying causes <sup>9</sup>
<b>Overall Goal</b>	Following from the problem statement, an identification of the goal to be achieved and how success will be identified
<b>Change Process</b>	Identify the mechanism of change linking the inputs to short-term output/outcomes and long-term goal
<b>Change Markers</b>	Identify milestones, indicators or other tools to assess/measure extent of change <sup>10</sup>
<b>Meta-Theory</b>	Define the underpinning theory that justifies the chosen change process
<b>Inputs</b>	Actions intended to catalyse the change process and corresponding timeline for change <sup>11</sup>
<b>Actors</b>	Identify the actors in the change process, define their roles and relationships
	End-users / Intended beneficiaries
	Implementing actors
	Spoilers
	Points of collaboration with other agencies
	Additional external stakeholders
<b>Domains of Change</b>	If applicable, identify various strands or thematic areas that must be addressed in order to achieve the change, potentially articulated as sub-theories <sup>12</sup>
<b>Internal Risks</b>	Identify potential impacts of the programme that may undermine its success
<b>Assumptions</b>	Identify beliefs, values, and unquestioned elements for each step of the change process
<b>External Risks</b>	Identify external risks to the programme with the potential to undermine its success and outline plans to overcome them
<b>Obstacles to Success</b>	Identify obstacles likely to threaten the change process and outline plans to overcome them
<b>Knock-On Effects</b>	Identify the potential unintended consequences of the project, both positive and negative

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.theoryofchange.org/wp-content/uploads/toco\\_library/pdf/UNDERSTANDINGTHEORYOFChangeSteinValtersPN.pdf](http://www.theoryofchange.org/wp-content/uploads/toco_library/pdf/UNDERSTANDINGTHEORYOFChangeSteinValtersPN.pdf)

## Sample donor priorities

Donor	Priority areas
CIDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Children and Youth</li> <li>• Democratic Governance</li> <li>• Education</li> </ul>
DFID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health</li> <li>• Wealth creation</li> <li>• Political and governance reforms</li> <li>• Girls and women</li> </ul>
SIDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Democracy and Human Rights</li> <li>• Climate and Environment</li> <li>• Gender and women's role in development</li> </ul>
USAID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agriculture and Food security</li> <li>• Democracy, human rights and Governance</li> <li>• Economic growth and trade</li> <li>• Health</li> </ul>
European Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human rights and governance</li> <li>• Food and agriculture</li> <li>• Economic growth</li> <li>• Infrastructure</li> <li>• Environment</li> </ul>

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## Interviewee list

No.	NAME	ORGANISATIONS
1.	Abdullahi	Trustee
2.	Dr. Colins Odote	Trustee
3.	Prof Miriam Were	Trustee
4.	Boaz Waruku	Trustee
5.	Hassan Kulundu	Editor Guild
6.	Susan Kariuki	Youth Agenda
7.	Fatuma Ali Saman	CEDMAC
8.	Regina Opondo	CRECO
9.	Abdullahi O. Sirat	NAMCEC
10.	Beatrice Odera and Kinyanjui Kamau	ECEP
11.	Winnie Wambua	CEDMAC
12.	James Wagalla	CIC
13.	Kwame Owino	IEA
14.	Waikwa Wanyoike	Katiba Institute
15.	Moris Odhiambo	Jukwaa La Katiba
16.	Mercy Njoroge	ELOG
17.	Henry Ochieng	KARA
18.	Magdalene Kariuki	KEWOPA
19.	Ali Hersi	SID
20.	George Kegoro	ICJ
21.	Brian Weke/Joshua Changwony	IED
22.	Samuel Kimeu	TI
23.	Martin Napisa	Degonsa / NTA
24.	Catherine Mwangi	KBC
25.	Tish Ndemi Enos Changulo	SIFA
26.	Munene Nyaga	NATION
27.	Ann Nderitu	IEBC
28.	Safia Abdi	Transition Authority (TA)
29.	Patricia Nyaundi	KNCHR
30.	Lucy Mathenge	UN Women
31.	Okello Okero	KNICE
32.	Jacqueline Mogeni	Council of Governors
33.	Sheila Ngatia	UNDP
34.	Robert Simiyu	CIDA
35.	John Tomaszewski	The international Republican Institute (IRI)
36.	Annette Omolo	World Bank
37.	Dorcas Gacugia	Royal Norwegian Embassy
38.	Grace Maingi	Uraia
39.	Nancy Nyamwea	Uraia
40.	Abubakar Said	Uraia
41.	Caroline Nyamu	Uraia
42.	Martin	Uraia
43.	Mshai Mwangola	Uraia
44.	Kilimo	Uraia

45.	Alloyce Moyi	Uraia
46.	FGD's	CSO Partners countrywide